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Abstract
This paper considers a game played among players who seek to extract payoffs
from a group of individuals subject to local interaction effects. We are interested
in the relation between the network of social interaction and equilibrium actions
and payoffs.
We start with an analysis of two economic examples – strategic advertising
in the presence of word of mouth advertising and social non-competitive mar-
keting – to bring out the simple point that changing network connections can
increase as well as decrease equilibrium actions and payoffs. This leads to an
investigation of general conditions on payoffs under which equilibrium actions
and payoffs increase/decrease with an increase in density of connections. We
also develop conditions under which a greater dispersion in network connec-
tions leads unambiguously to positive and negative effects on actions as well as
payoffs.
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1 Introduction
There are two groups of agents, M and N . Members in group M each choose a
strategy – which may be advertising, sending out free product samples or spreading
health messages in a community– with a view to influencing individuals N to choose
certain actions – such as the purchase of their product or the adoption of a particular
safety measure. The behavior of individuals in group N is subject to local influence:
for example a member of group N receives some information she shares it with her
friends and colleagues. Group N members make decisions based on the strategies
of group M members and the structure of social interaction. We study the relation
between the structure of social interaction and equilibrium actions and payoffs of
players in M. In particular, we are interested in the following questions.
1. How do changes in the network of relations – adding links to some players
or redistributing links among members of N – affect equilibrium strategies of
players in group M.
2. What is the relation between network structures and profits of players in M?
3. How doe this relation depend on the nature of the game that players of group
M are engaged in?
Social interaction among members of N is modeled as a network. Clearly, different
dimensions of networks can potentially influence individual behavior. Here, we focus
on the degree distribution of the network. There are many advantages to using a
degree distribution. First, the degree distribution summarizes a large amount of
information about the social interaction in a very simple and natural way. Second, it
allows us to formalize ideas about adding links or redistributing links in the network.
The notion of adding links to a network is formalized in terms of first order stochastic
relations between the degree distributions, while the idea of redistributing links is
formalized in terms of second order dominance relations. Third, with this approach
we can study the effects of additional information about social structures in a natural
way. At one extremeM members know nothing more than the degree distribution of
the network, while at the other extreme, the complete network architecture is common
knowledge. In between there is a whole range of knowledge levels which reflect how
much group M members know about the local network of each member of group N .
For example members of group M may know the degree distribution and the degree
of each member of group N . This possibility of varying information structures allows
us to study the value of network information.
The other important dimension of the problem is the nature of relation between
the strategic variables. In some contexts an increase in the action of a member ofM
may be beneficial for the other players, i.e. the actions generate positive externalities,
while in other contexts the variables may be negatively related. Similarly, the strategic
1
variables have effects on the marginal returns of different players and in some contexts
the marginal returns are increasing in the choices of others, i.e., games of strategic
complements, while in others are decreasing, i.e. games of strategic substitutes.
Our analysis develops sufficient conditions on payoff functions under which equilib-
rium strategies and payoffs increase or decrease with different types of changes in
the network. We illustrate these findings via a detailed discussion of two economic
examples: strategic advertising by firms and social marketing by non-governmental
agencies.
Our model of strategic advertising draws on the pioneering work of Butters (1977)
and Grossman and Shapiro (1984). Group M represents a set of firms which are
choosing advertising strategies, while group N may be viewed as consumers who
want to buy from the cheapest firm. Buyers are not aware about the existence of
the product and firms advertise to inform consumers of their product. Consumers
are connected in a network and they share information received from firms, via word
of mouth communication. In this example of advertising actions generate negative
externalities and the game is of strategic substitutes. Proposition 4.1 tells us that
there exists a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies in this game. Proposition
3.1 tells us that the intensity of advertising increases (decreases) with an increase in
word of mouth communication if costs of advertising are high (low). Proposition 3.1
also says that equilibrium payoffs are increasing if costs of advertising are low. We
then provide an example to show that equilibrium profits may fall as word of mouth
communication increases if costs of advertising are high. Finally, we show that a
redistribution of links in the mean preserving spread sense leads to an increase in
actions and a fall in profits if costs of advertising are small.
The second example is a model of social marketing where non-governmental orga-
nizations wish to spread a health message in a community. This model draws on
the theory of thresholds based behavior as in Granovetter (1978) and Lopez-Pintado
(2004). An individual is more likely to be persuaded about a safety measure if her
information is reinforced by the information of her friends and neighbors. Also, an
individual is more likely to be persuaded about a particular safety measure if she
receives messages from a number of different organizations. In contrast with the ad-
vertising example, in this application actions generate positive externalities and the
game is of strategic complements. Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 tell us that the equilibrium
actions as well as payoffs increase with an increase in the density of links. Similarly,
Propositions 3.4 shows that equilibrium actions and profits are both increasing with
a redistribution in the degree distribution.
A comparison of the results in the two examples highlights the main point we wish to
bring out in this paper: that equilibrium behavior and profits of players are jointly
2
shaped by the structure of interaction and the strategic nature of the variables. More-
over, our results develop conditions under which we can identify how changes in the
network alter equilibrium actions and payoffs.
This paper is a contribution to the study of the role of social structure in economic
activity.1 This theory studies how individual behavior is shaped by the network of
social connections, such as neighbors, friends, colleagues and research collaborators.
Influential papers in this line of work include Ballester, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou
(2006), Bala and Goyal (1998), Bramoulle and Kranton (2995), Ellison and Fudenberg
(1993,1995), Galeotti (2005), Galeotti et al. (2006), Goyal and Moraga (2001), and
Morris (2000). The existence of substantial social influence leads us to study ways
in which external players such as firms and governments should incorporate social
structure in the design of optimal strategies. In our earlier paper, Galeotti and
Goyal (2007), we studied the case of a single outside player; in the present paper
we extend the model to examine how social structure shapes strategic interaction
among external players. This extension shows that the ideas we introduced in the
earlier paper – such as ordering networks in terms of degree distributions and the
central role of the relation of marginal returns and degrees – are also important in
understanding play and payoffs in games of social influence. Our analysis of such
games yields new insights with regard to the effects of networks: for instance, in our
earlier paper, Galeotti and Goyal (2007) we showed that with a monopoly firm profits
always increase with an increase in word of mouth communication; by contrast, in
the present paper we find that firm profits may increase or decrease, and that this
depends on the costs of advertising.
The questions we address bear some similarity to the issues discussed in Ballester,
Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2005) and Calvo-Armengol and Barreda (2006). They
study criminal activity with local spillovers. In their framework individuals located
in a network choose actions which affect the payoffs of other individuals within the
network. They examine the question which individuals should be omitted from the
network if the objective is to minimize crime. Our paper differs in two ways, we
consider a different type of strategy – investments in influence – and we allow for
many external players.
Section 2 presents the general model. Section 3 studies two specific models. Section
4 provides the general analysis, while section 5 concludes. The appendix contains
technical details of some of the proofs.
1The important role of friends, neighbors and colleagues in shaping individual choices has been
brought out in a number of empirical studies over the years; influential works include Coleman
(1966), Conley and Udry (2004), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Feick and Price (1987).
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2 Model
We study a class of games in which there is a finite group of playersM = {1, 2, ...,m},
with m > 1, who exert costly effort with a view to getting a group of individuals to
choose an action.2 There is a unit measure of individualsN = [0, 1] and their behavior
is influenced by social interaction. In particular, individuals are located in a social
network and in principle the structure of the network can be complex and take on
a variety of forms. Players in M have limited knowledge of this network: they only
knows the proportion of individuals having different levels of social interaction.
For an individual i ∈ N , the level of social interaction is parameterized by a number
k, where k is termed the degree. We will suppose that each individual draws k others
with probability P (k) ≥ 0, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., k¯} = O and ∑k∈O P (k) = 1. She uses an
(atomless) uniform distribution on the unit interval to pick her sample. So, if she has
a k sized sample, she makes k draws, and each draw is independent. Now suppose
that the draw of the sample size is independent across individuals. We can then say
that there is fraction P (k) of individuals who choose a k sized sample. We will refer
to P as the degree distribution. Define kˆ =
∑
k∈O P (k)k as the average degree of
social interaction.
Given that the only information that players inM posses on the network is the degree
distribution, each player i ∈ M takes an action xi ∈ X = [0, 1]. A strategy profile
is then x = {x1, x2, ..., xM}. As is usual, x−i = {x1, ...xi−1, xi+1, xM} denotes the
strategies of all players other than i.
Given a strategy profile x, the payoffs to any player i ∈ M can be expressed as the
sum of profits that she gets from each individual in the network. Let profits from
an individual of degree k ∈ O be given by φk(xi,x−i), where φk(.) : XM → R. We
assume that φk(., .) is a twice continuously differentiable function of all strategies, and
that it is increasing and concave in own action. i.e. ∂φk(xi,x−i)
∂xi
≥ 0 and ∂2φk(xi,x−i)
∂x2i
≤ 0.
The expected net payoffs to player i given a degree distribution P and a strategy
profile (xi,x−i) are:
Πi(xi,x−i|P ) =
∑
k∈O
P (k)φk(xi,x−i)− C(α, xi), (1)
where C(.) : X → R is the cost of effort and we assume that it is increasing and
convex in xi. The parameter α ≥ 0 indicates the efficiency in generating efforts and
we will assume that the costs of effort and the marginal costs are strictly increasing
in α.
2The analysis for the case in which m = 1 can be found in our companion paper Galeotti and
Goyal (2007).
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The payoffs that player i ∈ M earns from choosing a strategy xi depend on the
actions of other players in M and on the way these actions are mediated via the
relationships between individuals in the network. Different assumptions pertaining
to such effects define different games and it is useful to state the conditions briefly
here.
Definition 2.1 The game exhibits strategic complements if for all k ∈ O, xi > x′i
and x−i ≥ x′−i: φk(xi,x−i) − φk(x′i,x−i) ≥ φk(xi,x′−i) − φk(x′i,x′−i). Analogously,
the game exhibits strategic substitutes if for all k ∈ O, xi > x′i and x−i ≥ x′−i:
φk(xi,x−i)− φk(x′i,x−i) ≤ φk(xi,x′−i)− φk(x′i,x′−i).
Definition 2.2 The game exhibits positive externalities if for all k ∈ O and (xi,x−i) ≥
(xi,x
′−i): φk(xi,x−i) ≥ φk(xi,x′−i). Analogously, the game exhibits negative exter-
nalities if for all k ∈ O and (xi,x−i) ≥ (xi,x′−i): φk(xi,x−i) ≤ φk(xi,x′−i).
Definition 2.3 A game exhibits increasing marginal returns in degree if for all xi >
x
′
i, x−i and k < k¯ − 1: φk+1(xi,x−i) − φk+1(x′i,x−i) ≥ φk(xi,x−i) − φk(x′i,x−i).
Analogously, a game exhibits decreasing marginal returns in degree if for all xi > x
′
i,
x−i and k < k¯ − 1: φk+1(xi,x−i)− φk+1(x′i,x−i) ≤ φk(xi,x−i)− φk(x′i,x−i).
A (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x
∗
M) such that
for every i ∈M,
Πi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i|P ) ≥ Πi(xi,x∗−i|P ),∀xi ∈ X (2)
The different conditions on payoffs are said to hold strictly if the inequalities are
strict.
Finally, with regard the structure of the network, we note that there are two issues
we will specially be concerned with, the addition of links and greater dispersion in the
links. In our context, where networks are measured in terms of degree distributions,
it is natural to view the addition of links in terms of first order stochastic dominance
(FOSD) shifts in the degree distribution. Similarly, we can naturally view redistri-
butions of links – say from regular graphs to unequal networks – in terms of second
order stochastic dominance shifts and mean preserving spreads (MPS) of the degree
distribution.
3 Economic Examples
In this section we develop some of the main ideas of our paper via a detailed discus-
sion of equilibrium strategies in two examples. The first is an example of strategic
advertising in the presence of word-of-mouth communication, while the second is a
model of social marketing.
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3.1 Strategic Advertising with word-of-mouth communica-
tion
Consider two firms advertising to a group of consumers, who share product infor-
mation among themeselves.3 The set of firms is M = {1, 2} and they produce a
homogeneous good at zero marginal cost. Each firm sells the object at price 1. The
set of buyers is N = [0, 1]; each buyer has inelastic demand and her reservation value
for the object is v = 1. Suppose that potential buyers are not aware of the existence
of the product and that firms undertake costly informative advertising.
A firm i ∈ M chooses xi ∈ [0, 1], which specifies the fraction of buyers in N who
receive advertisement directly from firm i. This comes at a cost αx2/2, α > 0.
A buyer may also receive information via word of mouth communication. In this
example, a buyer with degree k contacts k other consumers, from whom she obtains
the information about available products in the market, if any. If a consumer is only
informed about firm i’s product, then he buys the object from that firm. If he is
informed about the products of both firms then he picks one firm at random.
It then follows that for a given strategy profile x, the expected gross profits to firm i
from a k degree buyer are:
φk(xi, xj) =
[
1− (1− xi)k+1
] [
(1− xj)k+1 + 1
2
(1− (1− xj)k+1)
]
=
1
2
[
1− (1− xi)k+1
] [
1 + (1− xj)k+1
]
.
This is simply the probability that a consumer with k friends becomes either aware
only of firm i or of both firms. It is then easy to verify that this game satisfies strict
strategic substitutes and strict negative externalities. Also note that if x = x1 = x2
then φk(x, x) is increasing in k.
For a given distribution of connections P , we can then write the expected profits of
firm i under strategy x as:
Πi(xi, xj|P ) =
∑
k∈O
P (k)
2
[1− (1− xi)k+1][1 + (1− xj)k+1]− αx
2
i
2
,
An interior symmetric equilibrium x∗P solves:
∂Πi(x
∗
P , x
∗
P |P )
∂xi
=
∑
k∈O
P (k)
2
(k + 1)(1− x∗P )k[1 + (1− x∗P )k+1]− αx∗P = 0, (3)
3This example builds on the model of advertising introduced in Galeotti and Goyal (2007). That
paper looked at the case of a single firm, whereas the interest in this paper is in the case of 2 or
more firms.
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and it is easy to see that an interior symmetric equilibrium always exists.
We now examine the ways in which equilibrium advertising strategies and equilibrium
profits vary with the level and dispersion of word of mouth communication. We start
with the effects of an increase in the level of word of mouth communication.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose P ′ FOSD P . There exists α and α¯ such that if α > α¯ then
x∗P ′ ≥ x∗P , while if α < α then x∗P ′ ≤ x∗P . Furthermore, if α < α then Π(x∗P ′ , x∗P ′|P ′) ≥
Π(x∗P , x
∗
P |P )
Proof: The derivative of the marginal returns with respect to degree in a symmetric
equilibrium x∗P is:
∂2φk(x
∗
P , x
∗
P )
∂xi∂k
=
(1− x∗P )k
2
[
1 + (1− x∗P )k+1 + (k + 1)
[
1 + 2(1− x∗P )k+1
]
ln(1− x∗P )
]
(4)
It is easy to see that for sufficiently low x∗P the game exhibits increasing marginal
returns in degree, while for sufficiently high x∗P it exhibits decreasing marginal returns
in degree. Also note that, by investigation of the equilibrium condition 3, x∗P is
decreasing in α and that x∗P goes to zero when α → ∞, while x∗P goes to 1 when
α → 0. The first part of the proposition then follows from Proposition 4.2 and
Remark 4.2.
Note that this game satisfies the property of negative externalities, φk(., .) is increasing
in k and for all α < α the game exhibits decreasing marginal returns at x∗P . The result
on payoffs then follows from Proposition 4.3.

When the costs of advertising are low, firms advertise with high intensity. In this
case an increase in the level of word of mouth communication decreases the marginal
returns of advertising because buyers are very likely to become aware of products from
their cohorts. This observation and the fact that firms’ advertisements are strategic
substitutes imply that in the new equilibrium firms advertise less. The reverse holds
for high costs of advertising.
First note that for a given advertising level an increase in network density increases
the demand of each firm, so that firms’ profits increase. This is true regardless of the
level of the costs of advertising. However, an addition of links changes the equilibrium
advertising level which in turn alters the intensity of firms’ competition. Proposition
3.1 tells us that when advertising is sufficiently cheap, FOSD shifts lower equilibrium
efforts; the negative externality property implies that a firm can increase profits by
retaining old equilibrium advertising levels. So this must also be true in equilibrium.
Matters are more complicated when costs of advertising are high. Proposition 3.1 tells
us that for large costs of advertising a FOSD shift in connections raises equilibrium
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advertising. This negative externality property pushes toward lower profits, while the
FOSD shift in degrees pushes toward higher profits. The following example clarifies
this issue.
Example: Suppose that P (2) = 0.2, P (3) ∈ [0, 0.8] and P (1) = 1−P (2)−P (3) and
that C(α, x) = αx. In Figure 1 we plot the expected equilibrium profits of a firm as
function of P (3) for a high level of α and a low level of α, respectively. Note that an
increase in P (3) corresponds to a FOSD shifts in the degree distribution. Figure 1
shows that for low costs of advertising profits increase with FOSD shifts. However,
for high costs of advertising equilibrium firms’ profits fall with an increase in the level
of work of mouth communication.
We now turn to the effects of greater dispersion in word of mouth communication.
It turns out that the equilibrium response depends on whether the marginal returns
to advertisements are concave or convex in the degrees. In the former case, greater
dispersion implies a fall in expected marginal returns and under the concavity of
returns with respect to own advertisement as well as the strategic substitutability
between firms’ advertising this means that firms advertise less. The converse holds if
marginal returns are convex in degrees. Furthermore, for low costs of advertising also
the returns from an individual are concave in the degree, so that greater dispersion
decreases equilibrium profits. These ideas are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose P ′ is a MPS of P . There exists α and α¯ such that if
α > α¯ then x∗P ′ ≤ x∗P , while if α < α then x∗P ′ > x∗P . Furthermore, if α < α then
Π(x∗P ′ ,x
∗
−i,P ′|P ′) ≤ Π(x∗P ,x∗−i,P |P ).
Proof: Note that:
∂3φk(x
∗
P , x
∗
P )
∂xi∂k2
= (1−x∗P )k ln(1−x∗P )[2+4(1−x∗P )k+1+(k+1)(1+4(1−x∗P )k+1) ln(1−x∗P )].
(5)
For sufficiently low x∗P the marginal returns are concave in k, while they are convex for
sufficiently large x∗P . The change in xP then follows by noting that x
∗
P is decreasing
in α and invoking Proposition 4.4.
Note that at equilibrium the returns from a consumer are concave in degree. Further,
the game satisfies negative externalities and when α < α the marginal returns are
convex in k at equilibrium. The prove then follows from Proposition 4.5.

3.2 Social marketing
Consider M = 2 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) trying to spread a health
message concerning AIDS in a community. On the one hand, an individual is more
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likely to be persuaded about a particular safety measure if her information is rein-
forced by the information of her friends and neighbors. On the other hand, messages
sent by different organizations are complements so that an individual is more likely to
be persuaded about a particular safety measure if she receives different messages from
different NGOs. NGOs take this reinforcement mechanism into account when they
choose their social marketing activity. We formalize this example using a threshold
model, which we now introduce.
Each organization chooses a level of social marketing x ∈ [0, 1] which specifies the
fraction of individuals in N directly exposed to the social message. An individual ob-
serves messages directly received from NGOs and messages received by his neighbors.
If an individual observes s messages from one NGO and l messages from the other
organization he adopts a particular safety measure with some probability ψ(s, l).
Given our assumptions, the expected returns to organization i from a k degree indi-
vidual under a strategy profile (x1, x2) are
φk(x1, x2) =
∑
s∈O
(
k + 1
s
)
xs1(1− xs1)k+1−s
[∑
l∈O
(
k + 1
l
)
xl2(1− x2)k+1−lψ(s, l)
]
(6)
The properties of these payoffs ultimately depend on the properties of the function
ψ(k, s). For simplicity, here we focus on the case in which ψ(s, l) = sl/(k¯ + 1)2.
That is, the probability that an individual is persuaded to adopt a certain behavior
increases with the number of social messages he observes, but it is independent of his
neighbor’s size. In this case, we can rewrite expression (6) as:
φk(x1, x2) =
x1x2(k + 1)
2
(k¯ + 1)2
. (7)
It is easy to verify that this payoff satisfies the properties of strict strategic comple-
ments, strict positive externalities and increasing marginal returns in degree. Using
expression (7), the expected payoffs to agency i given a network distribution P , and
strategy profile (xi, xj), are:
Πi(x1, x2|P ) =
∑
k∈O
P (k)
x1x2(k + 1)
2
(k¯ + 1)2
− αxi.
An interior symmetric equilibrium x∗P ∈ (0, 1) solves:
∂Πi(x
∗
P , x
∗
P |P )
∂xi
=
∑
k∈O
P (k)
x∗P (k + 1)
2
(k¯ + 1)2
− α = 0, (8)
and, denoting by σ2 the variance of P , we can rewrite this equilibrium condition as:
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x∗P (σ
2 + (kˆ + 1)2
(k¯ + 1)2
− α = 0. (9)
It is now easy to see that an interior symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if
α ∈ (0, σ2+(kˆ+1)2
(k¯+1)2
), which is assumed hereafter.
The following proposition considers the effects of adding links in the network on the
equilibrium level of social marketing and NGOs’ equilibrium profits.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that P ′ FOSD P . Then x∗P ′ ≥ x∗P and Π(x∗P ′ , x∗P ′|P ′) ≥
Π(x∗P , x
∗
P |P ).
Proof: First observe that marginal returns are increasing in degree. The result on the
effects of FOSD degree shifts on equilibrium actions then follows from Proposition
4.2. Note that the returns are increasing in degree and this is a game of positive
externalities. Then Proposition 4.3 implies that profits go up with a first order shift
in the degree distribution. 
To get some intuition behind these results, note that the marginal returns are in-
creasing in degree and so a FOSD shift in degrees leads to an increase in expected
marginal returns and consequently to an increase in optimal actions. An increase in
optimal actions of a player lead to higher best responses of others, due to strategic
complements property of payoffs. The increase in equilibrium actions now follows
naturally. This positive effect on actions taken along with the positive externalites
property of payoffs immediately yields an increase in equilibrium profits.
We conclude by considering the effects of MPS shifts in the degree distribution.
Proposition 3.4 Suppose P ′ is a MPS of P . Then x∗P ′ ≥ x∗P and Π(x∗P ′ , x∗P ′|P ′) ≥
Π(x∗P , x
∗
P |P )
This result follows as a corollary of Proposition 4.5. Note that the marginal returns to
send health messages is convex in degree. Thus, a MPS shift in the degree distribution
increases the marginal returns from individual marketing activity. Similarly, the
returns from sending health messages are convex in degree, so that in more dispersed
networks profits are higher.
4 General Results
We now turn to the general model introduced in Section 2. We start by showing
existence of equilibrium.
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Proposition 4.1 Suppose expected payoffs are given by (1). Assume that the expected
payoffs are jointly continuous in players’ strategies and concave in own strategy. Then
there exists a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Furthermore, if the game
satisfies strict strategic substitutes then this equilibrium is unique.
Proof: The existence of a pure strategy equilibrium follows from the Debreu-Fan-
Glicksberg Theorem. The existence of a symmetric equilibrium follows from the
symmetry in payoffs and actions sets; for completeness we provide the details in the
appendix.
Finally, suppose that x and x′ are two symmetric strategy profiles and that for each
player i ∈ M, x′i > xi. Suppose without loss of generality that xi > 0. Equilibrium
implies that expected marginal returns are exactly equal to marginal costs. Concavity
in own strategy and strict strategic substitutes then implies that at x′ the expected
marginal returns are smaller than the marginal costs, which contradicts the hypothesis
that x′ is an equilibrium.

Remark 4.1 We observe that concavity of expected payoffs follows from the concavity
of φ and the convexity of C(α, x).
In what follows we focus on interior symmetric equilibria.4 An interior symmetric
equilibrium is a strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3, ..., x
∗
n) which solves:
∂Πi(x
∗,x∗−i)
∂xi
=
k¯∑
k∈O
P (k)
∂φk(x
∗,x∗−i)
∂xi
− ∂C(α, x
∗)
∂xi
= 0,∀i ∈M. (10)
We now examine the effects of an increase in the level of social interaction on the
equilibrium strategy. A FOSD shift in the degree distribution implies that the in-
dividuals located in the network are (on average) more connected. Intuitively, if
marginal returns from an individual are increasing in the degree, then players would
complement an increase of social interaction with higher effort. In contrast, if the
marginal returns are decreasing in degree, players exert less effort when the level of
social interaction increases.
The next proposition summarizes our analysis of FOSD shifts in degree distributions.
Proposition 4.2 Assume that the game exhibits either strategic complements or
strategic substitutes. Consider two degree distributions P and P
′
and suppose that
P
′
FOSD P . For every symmetric equilibrium x∗P under P there exists a symmet-
ric equilibrium x∗P ′ under P
′
such that x∗P ′ ≥ x∗P (x∗P ′ ≤ x∗P ) if the game exhibits
increasing (decreasing) marginal returns in degree.
4Sufficient conditions for the existence of an interior symmetric equilibrium are ∂φk(0,0,...,0)∂xi >
∂C(α,0)
xi
and ∂φk(1,1,...,1)∂xi <
∂C(α,1)
∂xi
, for all k ∈ O.
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Proof: Suppose the game exhibits increasing marginal returns in degree. We first
prove the proposition for games of strategic complements. Start with x∗P , since P
′
FOSD P and the game exhibits increasing marginal returns in degree it follows that
for each i ∈M: ∑
k∈O
P ′(k)
∂φk(x
∗
P ,x
∗
−i,P )
∂xi
− ∂C(α, x
∗
P )
∂xi
≥ 0.
If this expression equals 0, then x∗P is an equilibrium and the proof follows. Suppose it
is strictly positive and let each player i ∈M play her highest best response, say x1; by
concavity of gross payoffs and strict convexity of costs, x1 ≥ x∗. If x1 is an equilibrium
the proof follows. If it is not an equilibrium, iterate on the best response process.
Due to strategic complements and concavity of gross payoffs in own action, the best
response for each player is x2 ≥ x1. Since X is compact, this process converges and
the limit is a symmetric equilibrium with the desired property.
The proof for games with strategic substitutes is as follows. Suppose that x∗P ′ < x
∗
P .
Since x∗P is an interior equilibrium it must be the case that
∂Πi(x
∗
P ,x
∗
−i,P |P )
∂xi
=
∑
k∈O
P (k)
∂φk(x
∗
P ,x
∗
−i,P )
∂xi
− ∂C(α, x
∗
P )
∂xi
= 0. (11)
Note that:
∂Πi(x
∗
P ,x
∗
−i,P |P )
∂xi
≤ ∂Πi(x
∗
P ,x
∗
−i,P |P ′)
∂xi
(12)
<
∂Πi(x
∗
P ′ ,x
∗
−i,P ′|P ′)
∂xi
, (13)
where the first inequality is due to increasing marginal returns in degree and P ′
FOSD P , while the second inequality is due to strategic substitutes, concavity of
φk(., .) in own action, and strict convexity of the cost function. Thus, x
∗
P ′ cannot be
an equilibrium.
The proof for games with decreasing marginal returns in degree is analogous and is
omitted.

We note that the proof of Proposition 4.2 only exploits the property of increasing
marginal returns in degree locally (at equilibrium).
Remark 4.2 If the game satisfies increasing (decreasing) marginal returns in degree
at equilibrium x∗P then Proposition 4.2 holds.
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What are the effects of additional links on expected profits? An increase in the level
of social interaction has two effects that we need to keep track of. First, we need to
consider how FOSD shifts change profits, ceteris paribus. This depends on whether
the returns from an individual are increasing or decreasing in the degree. In the
former case FOSD shifts in the distribution of connections increase profits, while in
the latter case profits go down. Secondly, we need to consider how the equilibrium
response to FOSD shifts affects profits. Proposition 4.2 illustrates the impact of
FOSD shifts on the equilibrium strategy. It tells us that players increase (decrease)
effort if the marginal returns are increasing (decreasing) in degree. The impact of
such changes on expected profits depend on whether the game satisfies positive or
negative externalities.
Proposition 4.3 Assume that the game is either of strategic complements or strate-
gic substitutes. Consider two degree distributions P and P ′ and suppose that P ′ FOSD
P .
I. Suppose φk+1(xi,x−i) ≥ φk(xi,x−i) for all x and k. If the game exhibits positive
externalities and increasing marginal returns in degree then there exists x∗P and
x∗P ′ such that Π(x
∗
P ′ ,x
∗
−i,P ′|P ′) ≥ Π(x∗P ,x∗−i,P |P ). The same holds if the game
exhibits negative externalities and decreasing marginal returns in degree.
II. Suppose φk+1(xi,x−i) ≤ φk(xi,x−i) for all x and k. If the game exhibits negative
externalities and increasing marginal returns in degree then there exists x∗P and
x∗P ′ such that Π(x
∗
P ′ ,x
∗
−i,P ′|P ′) ≤ Π(x∗P ,x∗−i,P |P ). The same holds if the game
exhibits positive externalities and decreasing marginal returns in degree.
Proof: We prove Part I; the proof for Part II is analogous and omitted. First,
assume increasing marginal returns in degree, positive externalities and φk+1(x,x−i) ≥
φk(x,x−i). Since the game exhibits increasing marginal returns in degree, Proposition
4.2 implies that there exists x∗P ′ ≥ x∗P . Then,
Πi(x
∗
P ,x
∗
−i,P |P ) ≤ Πi(x∗P ,x∗−i,P |P ′)
≤ Πi(x∗P ,x∗−i,P ′|P ′)
≤ Πi(x∗P ′ ,x∗−i,P ′|P ′),
where the first inequality follows because φk+1(x
∗,x∗−i) ≥ φk(x∗,x∗−i) for all k and
because P ′ FOSD P . The second inequality follows because x∗P ′ ≥ x∗P and posi-
tive externalities, while the third inequality follows from optimality of equilibrium
strategies.
Second, note that if we assume decreasing marginal returns in degree, negative ex-
ternalities and φk+1(x,x−i) ≥ φk(x,x−i), the inequalities above still hold and that
completes the proof. 
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P ′ first order Positive Negative
stochastic dominate P Externalities Exteralities
Decreasing Marginal Ambiguous Π∗P ′ ≥ Π∗P
Returns in Degree
Increasing Marginal Π∗P ′ ≥ Π∗P
Returns in Degree Ambiguous
Table 1: φk non-decreasing in k
Table 1 summarizes the first part of Proposition 4.3. By way of illustration, let
us consider games of strategic substitutes and negative externalities (the strategic
advertising game is an example). If returns from an individual are increasing in
degree, greater social interaction makes a given strategy profile more effective in
influencing network members. That is, FOSD shifts in the degree distribution increase
expected payoffs, ceteris paribus. However, FOSD shifts also alter the equilibrium
strategy. Suppose the game exhibits decreasing marginal returns in degree. Then
Proposition 4.2 implies that the equilibrium strategy will entail lower efforts. Negative
externalities then implies that the new equilibrium profits are higher. In this class
of games profits will be higher in denser networks. In contrast, if the game exhibits
increasing marginal returns in degree, a FOSD shift increases the equilibrium effort
level, which, due to negative externalities, decreases profits. In this case the two
effects go in opposite directions and whether profits increase or decrease will depend
on the specific game. We note that in the strategic advertising example, the marginal
returns are decreasing (increasing) in degree for low (high) values of α. It is for
this reason that we are able to obtain clear cut results in the case of low costs of
advertising, while the results in the case of high costs of advertising are ambiguous.
We now study the effects of redistributing links within a network by considering MPS
shifts in the degree distribution. By inspection of the equilibrium condition (10) we
note that the effect of such shifts depend on the curvature of the marginal returns
from network members.
Proposition 4.4 Assume that the game is either of strategic complements or strate-
gic substitutes. Consider two degree distributions P and P
′
and suppose that P
′
is a
MPS of P . If the marginal returns are concave (convex) in k, then for every symmet-
ric equilibrium x∗P under P there exists a symmetric equilibrium x
∗
P ′ under P
′ such
that x∗P ′ ≤ x∗P (x∗P ≤ x∗P ′).
Proof. Suppose that the marginal returns are concave in the degree. The proof
for the case where marginal returns are convex in the degree is analogous and omitted.
First, consider strategic complements. Start with x∗P . Since P
′ is a MPS of P and
since the marginal returns are concave in the degree, it follows that for all i ∈M:
∂Πi(x
∗
P ,x
∗
−i,P |P ′)
∂xi
≤ ∂Πi(x
∗
P ,x
∗
−i,P |P )
∂xi
= 0.
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In the case of equality the proof follows. Suppose the inequality holds strictly. Let
each player play her lowest best response, say x1; by concavity of gross payoffs and
strict convexity of costs, x1 < x∗P . If x
1 is an equilibrium the proof follows. Other-
wise, note that the best response of each player, given x1, is lower (due to strategic
complements). We can then iterate the process and, since X is compact, this process
converges and the limit is a symmetric equilibrium with the desired properties.
Second, consider games of strategic substitutes. Suppose that x∗P ′ > x
∗
P . Since x
∗
P in
an interior equilibrium it must be the case that:
∂Πi(x
∗
P ,x
∗
−i,P |P )
∂xi
= 0.
Next, note that
∂Πi(x
∗
P ,x
∗
−i,P |P )
∂xi
≥ ∂Πi(x
∗
P ,x
∗
−i,P |P ′)
∂xi
>
∂Πi(x
∗
P ′ ,x
∗
−i,P ′|P ′)
∂xi
,
where the first inequality follows because the marginal returns are concave in degree
and P ′ is a MPS of P , while the second inequality follows from the hypothesis that
x∗P ′ > x
∗
P , strategic substitutes, φk(., .) is concave in own actions and C(., .) is strictly
convex. This contradicts the hypothesis that x∗P ′ > x
∗
P is an equilibrium.
The intuition underlying Proposition 4.4 is as follows: suppose that the game exhibits
strategic complements. If the marginal returns from an individual are concave in
degree, a MPS shift in the degree distribution decreases the expected marginal returns
and therefore players exert less effort. In the case of strategic complements a fall in
actions of others reinforces this pressure and compactness of strategy set guarantees
the existence of a lower equilibrium. In the case of games with strategic substitutes,
suppose that the equilibrium effort increases; concavity of gross payoffs in own action
as well as falling marginal returns in degree and strategic substitutes imply that
marginal returns are strictly lower. However, since the cost function is strictly convex,
the marginal costs are strictly larger, which is inconsistent with equilibrium.
The next proposition concludes the analysis by showing the effects of greater disper-
sion on equilibrium profits
Proposition 4.5 Assume that the game is either of strategic complements or strate-
gic substitutes. Consider two degree distributions P and P
′
and suppose that P ′ is a
MPS of P .
I Suppose φk(xi,x−i.) is concave in k for all x. If marginal returns are concave in
k and the game exhibits positive externalities then there exists x∗P and x
∗
P ′ such
that Π(x∗P ,x
∗
−i,P |P ) ≥ Π(x∗P ′ ,x∗−i,P ′|P ′). The same holds if marginal returns are
convex in k and there are negative externalities.
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II Suppose φk(xi,xi) is convex in k for all x. If marginal returns are concave in
k and the game exhibits negative externalities then there exists x∗P and x
∗
P ′ such
that Π(x∗P ,x
∗
−i,P |P ) ≤ Π(x∗P ′ ,x∗−i,P ′|P ′). The same holds if marginal returns are
convex in k and there are positive externalities.
Proof: We prove Part I; the proof for Part II is analogous and omitted. First, suppose
that marginal returns are concave in k and the game exhibits positive externalities.
Since marginal returns are concave in k, Proposition 4.4 implies that there exists
x∗P ′ ≤ x∗P . Then,
Πi(x
∗
P ′ ,x
∗
−i,P ′|P ′) ≤ Πi(x∗P ′ ,x∗−i,P ′|P )
≤ Πi(x∗P ′ ,x∗−i,P |P )
≤ Πi(x∗P ,x∗−i,P |P ),
where the first inequality follows because φk(., .) is concave in k and P
′ is a MPS of
P , the second inequality follows because x∗P ′ ≤ x∗P and positive externalities. The
third inequality follows from optimality of equilibrium strategy.
Second note that the same inequalities holds if marginal returns are convex in k and
the game exhibits negative externalities.

5 Conclusion
This paper considers a game played among players who seek to extract payoffs from a
group of individuals subject to local interaction effects. A well known example of such
a game is strategic advertising by firms in the presence of word of mouth advertising
among consumers. We are interested in issues such as the existence of equilibrium for
given networks of interaction as well as the effects of changing networks on equilibrium
actions and payoffs.
Networks are complicated objects and the first step is to develop a simple measure
of ordering and classifying them; following the example of the recent literature in
statistical physics, in this paper we focus on the distribution of connections, viz. the
degree distribution. The analysis proceeds by looking at how equilibrium varies with
changes in the degree distribution.
An analysis of economic examples suggests that changing network connections can
increase as well as decrease equilibrium actions and payoffs. This led to an investi-
gation of general conditions on payoffs under which equilibrium actions and payoffs
increase/decrease with an increase in density of connections. We also developed condi-
tions under which a greater dispersion in network connections lead to unambiguously
positive and negative effects on actions as well as payoffs.
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In this paper we have studied the simplest case where members of group M only
know the degree distribution of the network. In future work, it will be interesting to
examine the case where players know more about the network, and indeed to examine
how valuable it is to learn about the network in a strategically competitive situation.
Appendix
Proof of existence of symmetric equilibrium: We now prove existence of sym-
metric equilibria. Consider player i ∈M with strategy xi ∈ X who faces a symmetric
profile in which all M − 1 players choose x′ ∈ M. Let x′−i a M − 1 vector in which
each element is x′. Thus, we may define a payoff pii(xi,x′−i) of player i as follows
pi(xi,x
′−i) =
∑
k∈O
P (k)φk(xi,x
′−i)− C(α, xi).
Since φk(., .) is concave in own action for every k and C(., .) is strictly convex in own
action, this function is strictly concave in xi. Now define a best response correspon-
dence ρi : X → X as follows
ρi(x
′) = argmax
xi∈X
pii(xi,x
′−i).
The compactness and non-emptiness of X and the joint continuity of pii(xi,x′−i) with
respect to xi and x
′−i implies that ρi(.) is upper semi-continuous. On the other hand,
the convexity and non-emptiness of X and the concavity of φi(xi,x′−i) with respect
to xi for every x
′−i imply that ρi is convex and non-empty for every x′−i, where x′−i
is defined as above. We can then invoke Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem to conclude
that there exists a fixed point x∗i such that x
∗ ∈ ρi(x∗).

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